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RECOVERY FOR PURE ECONOMIC LOSS IN
TORT: ANOTHER LOOK AT ROBINS
DRY DOCK V. FLINT
VICTOR P. GOLDBERG*

I.

INTRODUCTION

IN Robins Dry Dock and Repair Co. v. Flint,

1

the Supreme Court laid
down the general proposition that claims for pure economic loss are not
recoverable in tort. Although courts have sometimes ignored or distinguished Robins, its holding is still a central feature of tort law. In a recent
en bane decision regarding claims by those injured by a chemical spill in
the Mississippi River, the Fifth Circuit engaged in an extensive debate
over the continued vitality of Robins and concluded (despite five dissenters) that it remained good law. 2
The Robins rule is overbroad, lumping together a number of very different problems. Many of the claims barred by the economic loss doctrine
are easily distinguishable from Robins. 3 Of course the Robins rule need
* Thomas Macioce Professor of Law and Economics and codirector of the Center for
Law and Economic Studies, Columbia University. I thank William K. Jones, Julie Nelson,
Linda Silberman, and the participants in the Law and Economics Workshop at Georgetown
University for comments on an earlier draft of this article. I also thank Kathy Simonetti
and Catherine Valcke for research assistance.
1
275 U.S. 303 (1927). The doctrine substantially predates Robins. See, for example,
Cattle v. Stockton Waterworks Company, L. R. IO Q. B. 453 (1875).
2
State of Louisiana Ex. Rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1985).
Shortly thereafter, Judge Breyer also followed Robins in a suit for economic losses arising
from an oil spill; see Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru 764 F.2d 50 (1st Cir. 1985). In
its most recent treatment of the question of tort liability for economic loss, the Supreme
Court cited Robins. although it did not find it necessary to address Robins's present status.
It held that under the circumstances of the case a manufacturer was not liable in tort to a
commercial customer for purely economic losses arising from a defective product. It did
"not reach the issue whether a tort cause of action can ever be stated in admiralty when
the only damages sought are economic." East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica
Delaval Inc. 476 U.S. 858,871 n.6 (1986).
3
Technically, since this was an admiralty case, Flint was a libellant and Robins a respondent.
[Journal of Legal Studies. vol. XX (June 1991)]
© 1991 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/91/2002-0004$01.50
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not give the wrong result in other cases of economic loss, but the doctrine
gives no guidance as to why liability should be denied and fails to identify
cases in which denial of recovery for economic losses is the wrong
outcome.
Robins involved the claim of the charterer of a ship for compensation
for the two weeks the vessel was out of service as a result of the negligence of a dry dock in performing scheduled repairs. Since the charter
excused the charterer from paying rent to the owner while the ship was
in dry dock, the charterer's losses were the difference between the rental
rate to the owner and the market value of the ship's services for the two
weeks it was out of use. The charterer sued the owner for breach of
contract and lost; 4 thereafter it sued the dry dock company and, after
winning at trial and in the court of appeals, it lost in the Supreme Court.
Justice Holmes held, in an opinion that Judge Wisdom has characterized
as "a great judge ... [having] an off-day, " 5 that the charterers had no
damage claim in contract or in tort against the dry dock and that the
complaint must be dismissed.
In the narrowest sense, Robins need not be classified as a tort case at
all. All the parties-dry dock, owner, and charterer-were linked contractually. The losses that might result from the dry dock's negligence
could have been allocated by the parties in their initial contracts. 6 But
the same basic problem can arise in the more common circumstance in
which the wrongdoer is a stranger. For example, the triggering event
might have been a collision with another vessel. The essential feature of
Robins is that the tort injured two parties who were in a position to
allocate a damage award between themselves in their initial contract.
All that was at stake in Robins was the plaintiff's claim for the favorable
price of its charter. In eminent domain language, the plaintiff sued for
the "bonus value" of the charter-the difference between the contract
price and the market price. The scope of this article is restricted to the
bonus value problem and to some very modest extensions. The article
should be viewed as a self-contained piece of a larger project: a reexamination of the economic loss doctrine. The pivotal role played by Robins
4

The Bjornefjord, 271 Fed. 682 (2d Cir. 1921).
State of La. ex Rel. Guste v. M/V Testbank 728 F.2d 748, 750 (5th Cir. 1984).
6
Robins could really have been marginalized if subsequent courts had restricted its
application to cases in which a plaintiff tried an end run around contractual limitations on
its recovery. In fact, the courts did the opposite. Not only did the rule apply when the
wrongdoer was a stranger, but it applied to a wide range of claims from a diverse group of
third parties. If the charterer's delay resulted in late deliveries to a factory, for example,
the Robins doctrine would have barred recovery for damages suffered by the factory, its
employees, its customers, and so forth.
5
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in the development and continued maintenance of that doctrine justifies
a detailed analysis of the case and of the bonus value problem. But it is
important to emphasize that an understanding of Robins does not necessarily provide much of an insight into the myriad other problems classified
under the heading of "economic loss. " 7 I suspect that Gary Schwartz is
correct in arguing for a nonunitary approach:
I recommend that we abandon any effort to formulate any single general theory:
for the economic loss problem, as I understand it, is multiform rather than unitary
in character. Unfair competition differs from fraud, which in tum differs from
negligent misrepresentation, which in turn differs from the negligent polluting of
public fishing waters, which in tum differs from the lawyer's malpractice liability
to his client (let alone to a range of third parties), which in tum differs from the
destruction of buildings by fire, which in tum differs from compensating plaintiffs
for lost income in personal injury suits. 8

The organization of the article is as follows. In the next section, I
summarize the facts of the case and its legal history. In the following
section, I analyze the compensability of the bonus value, asking both
whether the tortfeasor should be responsible for the loss and, if so, who
should receive the compensation. Section IV is a brief digression. In
Section V, I extend the discussion to some closely related questions:
first, what should be the outcome if the charter had not excused the
charterer from making payments while the ship was out of service; second, what if the contract had specified a sharing formula for compensating
the owner? The Robins result does not, I suggest, carry over to these
cases.
II.

THE ROBINS FACTS

On September 13, 1913, Flint, Goering and Co. entered into a five-year
charter agreement with Joh. Ludw. Mowinckel and Son, the owners of
the Norwegian steamship Bjornefjord. 9 Flint did not charter the ship for
7
In an earlier article, I analyzed another problem that is typically classified as an economic loss problem-third-party tort claims against accounts; see Victor P. Goldberg, Accountable Accountants: Is Third-Party Liability Necessary? 17 J. Legal Stud. 295 (1988).
8
Gary T. Schwartz, Economic Loss in American Tort Law: The Examples of J'Aire and
of Products Liability, 23 San Diego L. Rev. 37, 38 (1986).
9
Much of what follows is taken from the transcript of the trial (which includes the
opinions of trial judge Henry Goddard and the commissioner he appointed, Mark Maclay).
The trial was a brief one, the transcript being only five pages long. The testimony before
the commissioner was considerably more detailed, but it was not reproduced for the Supreme Court. All page references to the trial transcript and the opinions of Goddard and
Maclay are cited in 38 Cases and Points for 275 S. Ct. (hereafter cited as Cases and Points).
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its own use. Rather, it was an intermediary that subchartered to end
users. The rental rate was 1,200 pounds per month. (The exchange rate
at the time was 4. 7555 dollars to the pound.) This turned out to be an
excellent price for Flint, since the price of shipping services soared in
World War I. The parties modified the charter in August 1917, increasing
the rent £250 per month, to cover some increased expenses due to the
war. This price, however, was still well below the current market price.
Flint subchartered the ship in 1915 for twenty-six months at a rate of
about £11,200 per month. It was rechartered to Norton, Lilly, and Co.
for nearly £16,995 ($80,819.72) per month for a sixteen-month term beginning on August I, 1917. (All of these prices were reduced by a 2 1/z percent
commission.)
On July 29, 1917, the owners sent the ship to Robins Dry Dock and
Repair Co. for routine maintenance. In the course of replacing a damaged
propeller, a Robins employee allowed the spare propeller to fall. A blade
broke, and it was necessary to have a new propeller cast. As a result of
the accident, the ship was held out of service an additional fourteen days.
The charter and subcharter agreements included the identical cesser of
hire clauses, which, with minor wording changes, are still used in most
time charters today. 10 The clauses held that hire would be suspended
while the ship was out of service for specified reasons, including the
ship's being in dry dock. Thus, during the fourteen days, Flint Jost the
difference between the rent Norton was supposed to pay to Flint and
the rent Flint was supposed to pay to Mowinckel. The gross loss was
$2,541.91 per day, or $35,586.76 for the fourteen days; Flint was relieved
of paying $3,036.17 for the fourteen days, so the net loss was $32,550.57. 11
10
''That in the event of the loss of time from deficiency of men or stores, breakdown of
machinery, stranding, fire or damage preventing the working of the vessel for more than
twenty-four running hours, the payment of the hire shall cease until she be again in an
efficient state to resume her service; but should she in consequence put in to any port,
other than that to which she is bound, the Port Charges and Pilotages at such Port shall be
borne by the Steamer's Owners, but should the vessel be driven into Port, or to anchorage
by stress of weather, or from accident to the cargo, such detention or loss of time shall be
at the Charterer's risk and expense . . . . That as the steamer may be from time to time
employed in tropical waters during the term of this Charter, steamer is to be docked, bottom
cleaned and painted whenever Charterers and Master think necessary, but at least once in
every six months, and payment of the hire to be suspended until she is again in proper state
for service" (Cases and Points, supra note 9, at 14, 32).
11
A number of other cases arose during the war in which the charterer had an extremely
favorable price. In Hines v. Sangstad S. S. Co., 266 F. 502 (1st Cir. 1920), the owner's
damage was $2,669.95, and the charterer's, $15,473.32; in Siberia S. S. Corp. v. S. S.
Binghamton, 271 F. 69 (2nd Cir. 1921), the owner's damage was $13,750.00, and the time
charterer's damage, $20,824.98. In The Aquitania, 270 F. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1920), the owner's
damage was $1,000,000 (including tangible property damage), and the time charterer's loss
was $1,700,000.
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Flint, obviously, wanted to be compensated for these losses. It realized
immediately that it was in a somewhat awkward legal position. It wrote
a letter to the ship's captain, on August 10, four days before the ship had
been released, expressing concern over the delay and informing the captain that it was suffering damages at the rate of $75,000 per monthY It
intended to recover the money from Robins but recognized that there
might be legal difficulties:
We feel that under the facts now before us the Robins Company should pay our
claim and we intend to endeavor to collect it from them and purpose to send
them a notice to that effect if you have no objections.
But our Attorneys tell us that under the peculiar circumstances it is doubtful if
we can collect direct from Robins as we have no contractual relations with them,
and that to protect ourselves we must make claim against your owners for our
damages so that you and they may then recover the amount from the Robins
people and settle with us. In other words, that you and your owners should collect
our damages as well as yours from the Robins people and pay over to us our
damages.
We accordingly have no alternative but to herewith make formal claim upon your
owners through you for whatever damages we have suffered or may hereafter
suffer by reason of the above detention and loss of use of the vessel.
We have explained to you, however, and herewith repeat, that if the Robins
Company is responsible we naturally do not desire your owners to lose money,
and we will do everything possible to force Robins to pay and will cooperate fully
to this end. 13

For reasons that are not entirely clear, the owners of the Bjornefjord
did not cooperate with Flint. They entered into a settlement with Robins
on December 7, 1917, about four months after the accident occurred. The
owners received $3,271.21 (approximately the lost rent) and gave Robins
a release from all further liability to the owners. 14 However, the release
did not affect Robins's possible liability to Flint. 15
Flint then brought suit against the owners of the Bjornefjord. Its argument was not that the owners had failed to represent its interests following the accident. 16 Rather, Flint argued that the owners had failed to
12 It wrote to Robins on the same day to inform the dry dock that "we hold you liable
and responsible for our damages either direct or to us through the owners" (Cases and
Points, supra note 9, at 16).
13 Id. at 13.
14
Id. at 6.
15
Id. at 15.
16
The Bjornefjord, supra note 4.
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"maintain her in a thoroughly efficient state" as required in clause one
of the charter agreement, and hence the remedies specified in the cesser
of hire clauses did not apply. Learned Hand dismissed the suit at trial on
the grounds that the delay was caused by one of the defined conditions
and that the contract defined the remedy. 17 The appellate court affirmed
on slightly different grounds. The owner, said the court, met its duty by
exercising reasonable and ordinary care to restore the vessel by using an
"experienced, reputable, and fully equipped ship repair concern. " 18
Flint filed its suit against Robins in 1920. 19 At the trial, Judge Goddard
held that the central issue was whether the charterer's interest was a
property interest: "Is the right to the use of a vessel a property right
which the law recognizes and protects? If a third party, not the owner of
the vessel, through negligence, deprives the charterer of this right, has
he any remedy? ... If he has a property right, is he not entitled to a
direct remedy? An analogy might be found in cases of eminent domain
where the lessee, as well as the owner, is held entitled to compensation.
If the charterer has a property interest in the vessel, then he has a right
of action against one who damages his property. " 20 Since Flint had a
property right, he argued, it was entitled to compensation and he referred
the case to a commissioner to reckon the damages. 21 The commissioner
found the damages of $32,550.57 plus prejudgment interest (for August
1, 1917, through September 1, 1925) of $15,787.03; the total judgment,
therefore, was $48,337.60. 22
The decision was affirmed on appeal to Judge Mack (joined by Learned
Hand, who had by this time been elevated to the Court of Appeals). The
reasons adduced, however, were different. Judge Mack rejected Flint's
contract claim (ignored by Judge Goddard) that was based on the notion
that Flint was a third-party beneficiary of the contract between the dry
dock and the owners. 23 Judge Goddard's assertion 24 that the charterer
had a property right was also rejected. 25 Nonetheless, Judge Mack held
that Robins's "liability for its tortious act is the actual damage done to
17

Id. at 683.
Id. at 683.
19
I suspect that it filed this suit before resolution of its suit against the owners because
the statute of limitations was about to expire. The case against Robins was not heard until
October 1923.
2
Cases and Points, supra note 9, at 21-22.
21
Goddard relied upon The Aquitania, supra note 11.
22
Cases and Points, supra note 9, at 32.
23 Robins Dry Dock v. Flint, 13 F.2d 3, 4 (2d Cir. 1926).
24 Bjornefjord 1924 A.M.C. 740, 744.
25 Robins, supra note 23, at 5.
18

°
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the combined interests in the ship. The measure of the total recovery is
the market value of the loss of the use. " 26 He continued: "If there had
been no charter, the entire loss would have been sustained by the owner;
therefore he could have recovered that amount for himself. The wrongdoer has no interest in and should not benefit because of the contractual
obligations of the shipowner to the charterer or the absence of any liability of the owner to the charterer for respondent's negligence. " 27 The
existence of a below-market charter, in short, should not let the tortfeasor
off the hook. Robins is liable for the market value of the loss of use, and
that liability should be unaffected by the existence of the charter. "[T]he
result reached involves no injustice to [Robins]. Its liability for its tortious
act is the actual damage done to the combined interests in the ship. " 28
The owner, Mack suggested, could be viewed as a trustee for the charterer, collecting the entire damage amount from Robins and returning to
Flint the amount in excess of the contract rent. However, since the owner
had already settled its claims, Mack had to justify Flint's suing directly
for its injuries. "It is unnecessary to determine in the instant case whether
the charterer's right to recover for his loss is direct against the wrong_doer, enforceable by a libel independent of that which the shipowner but
for the release could have brought for his damages, or whether it is indirect based upon the equitable obligation of the shipowner to the charterer. " 29 The right result for Mack had two components. First, the tortfeasor had to bear the full costs of the incident; and, second, that the division
of the award be determined by the price specified in the initial charter.
He was not particularly concerned with the path used to reach this result.
Justice Holmes, like Mack, dismissed the notion that Flint was a thirdparty beneficiary to the Bjornefjord-Robins contract. The district court's
notion that the charterer had a property right in the vessel "although
it is not argued that there was a demise, and the owners remained in
possession, " 30 was also dismissed without discussion. Holmes argued
Id.
Id.
2s Id.
29 Id. at 6.
30
Robins, supra note I, at 308. For those readers whose admiralty vocabulary has become somewhat rusty, a demise (or bare-boat) charter is one in which the owner "part[s]
entirely with the command, possession, and control of his vessel.'' 2B Benedict on Admiralty, at § 52 (7th ed. rev. 1990). The captain and crew, for example, are hired by the
charterer and he bears responsibility for their decisions (including liability for collisions).
Under a time charter, the owner provides captain and crew. It has long been established
that the demise charterer has a property interest pro hac vice (for all practical purposes).
In their treatise, Gilmore and Black cite cases on this point predating Robins by more than
half a century; Grant Gilmore & Charles L. Black, Jr., The Law of Admiralty, at § 4-23
26

21
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that the damage to the propeller was a wrong only to the owner, even
though the charterer's loss flowed directly from that wrong. He cited the
general rule that "a tort to the person or property of one man does not
make the tortfeasor liable to another merely because the injured person
was under a contract with that other, unknown to the doer of the
wrong. " 31 Thus, Flint cannot recover because there is no contract duty
(it is not a third-party beneficiary), no property right (the charter is a
time charter, not a demise charter), and no tort duty (no privity and no
responsibility for pure economic loss).
Holmes then concludes by rejecting Judge Mack's notion that the charterer might recover or some variation on the owner-as-trustee argument:
The decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals seems to have been influenced by
the consideration that if the whole loss occasioned by keeping a vessel out of use
were recovered and divided a part would go to the respondents. It seems to have
been thought that perhaps the whole might have been recovered by the owners,
that in that event the owners would have been trustees for the respondents to the
extent of the respondent's share, and that no injustice would be done to allow
the respondents to recover their share by direct suit. But justice does not permit
that the petitioner be charged with the full value of the loss of use unless there
is some one who has a claim to it as against the petitioner. The respondents have
no claim either in contract or in tort, and they cannot get a standing by the
suggestion that if some one else had recovered it he would have been bound to
pay over a part by reason of his personal relations with the respondents. 32

Two things should be noted about Holmes's opinion. First, it is short on
justification. Flint could recover if it had a property interest; it did not;
ergo, no recovery. There is no attempt to question the doctrines that, in
Holmes's perception, bar recovery. Second, Holmes does not say how
the claim of the owners and charterers interact. Even though both parties
raised the question in their briefs, 33 Holmes does not say whether the
owners could have received compensation for the market value of the

(2d ed. 1975). Thus, Holmes appears to be saying that if Flint had had a demise charter, it
clearly would have won. A mere time charter, however, does not give Flint a property
interest.
31
Robins, supra note I, at 309.
32 Id.
33
See Cases and Points, supra note 9, Brief for Petitioner, at 16-18; and Brief for Respondents, at 4. ("What might have happened if the suit had been brought by the owner and
the owner had refused to turn over to the charterers their proper share of the recovery is
not in issue in this suit.")
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ship had they chosen to pursue their legal remedy. 34 I will return to that
question in Sections IV and V. 35

III.

CoMPENSA TION FOR THE Bo Nus VALUE

It is important to recognize what is at stake in this dispute. Flint's
claim is that it lost a favorable price-the bonus value. Robins damaged
an asset and the charter determined how that loss would be divided between Mowinckel and Flint. The issues are the magnitude of Robins's
liability, the apportionment of its liability, the extent to which these are
affected by agreements entered into by the parties before the negligent
act occurred, and the extent to which these are affected by the form in
which the claims are pressed (that is, should it matter if Mowinckel sued
as a trustee for Flint rather than Flint suing on its own behalf).
It is useful to begin the analysis by recalling Judge Goddard's syllogism: (I) the problem is analogous to the treatment of the taking by
eminent domain of the leasehold interest; (2) if the charterer had a property interest, it would be entitled to compensation by anyone who damages that property; (3) the analogy establishes that the charterer did have
a property right; (4) therefore, it should be compensated. Mack and
Holmes rejected the conclusion by denying the third step. One can reject
Goddard's argument while nevertheless finding his analogy instructive.
In this section I will reconsider Goddard's analogy. My analysis suggests that Goddard's conclusion was wrong: charterers should not recover. (It is less clear, however, as to the outcome of a suit by the owner
for recovery of the bonus value.) Oddly, Goddard did not suggest an even
more appropriate analogy, the tenant's right to sue a tortfeasor for damage to its leasehold interest. That line of inquiry is pursued in the last
part of this section. That discussion, while it is not conclusive, provides
some support for the conclusions suggested by the eminent domain
analogy.

34
Nor does it say how a suit by Flint against the owners claiming a breach of trust should
come out. The argument would be that the owners had a duty to represent the charterer's
interest in the settlement negotiations with Robins. Robins' counsel notes in its brief that
the tort it is accused of is roughly of this type: "The so-called tort as to the charterers
seems to have consisted in the petitioner's [Robins] obtaining a release from the shipowners
without paying the full amount of the damages that the shipowners might possibly have
recovered" (Cases and Points, supra note 9, Brief for Petitioner, at 20).
35
Holmes was similarly opaque in an eminent domain case a quarter century earlier. In
Emery v. Boston Terminal Co., 178 Mass. 172, 185, 59 NE 763 (1901), he denied compensation to a tenant for the loss of the expectation of renewal, but he implied that the owner
might have sued directly for those losses which he was denying plaintiffs.
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A.

The Eminent Domain Analogy

Both the landlord and tenant have a constitutionally protected interest
in leased property taken under eminent domain. 36 The government must
pay compensation based on what the land would be worth if it were
subject to unified ownership (the undivided fee rule). 37 The award is then
apportioned between the landlord and tenant according to their respective
interests. For a standard space lease, the landlord would receive the
present value of the stipulated rent for the duration of the lease plus the
reversion and the tenant would receive the market value of the leasehold
interest-the bonus value.
The undivided fee rule makes good economic sense in both the eminent
domain and tort context. The social harm done is measured by what is
taken or destroyed, and the magnitude of the harm is unaffected by the
existence of the leasehold. 38 If we want governments (or potential tortfeasors) to be confronted with the true social costs of their activities, the
undivided fee rule does just that, at least in principle. 39 We will return to
the qualification below.
The rule of division makes less sense. This is illustrated by the fact
that parties almost invariably contract around it. Leases usually include
condemnation clauses that undo the constitutionally generated rule of
division. Where only the bonus value is at stake, the clauses generally
specify that, in the event of a government taking of the entire leased
property, the lease terminates and, therefore, the entire condemnation
award goes to the landlord. 40
The unpopularity of the default rule is easily understood. The tenant's
share is the bonus value of the lease. If conditions improve after the
lease is signed, the bonus value will turn out to be positive; if conditions
deteriorate, it will turn out to be negative. But, so long as there is no
systematic bias, when the parties enter into the lease, the expected value

36
Victor P. Goldberg, Thomas W. Merrill, & Daniel Unumb, Bargaining in the Shadow
of Eminent Domain: Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards between Landlord
and Tenant, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1083, 1086-87 (1987).
37
Id. at 1092.
38
This is a slight simplification; the nuances are considered in id. at 1094-1106.
39
Bishop and Sutton make this argument and use Robins to illustrate the point: "[T]he
existence or nonexistence of a contract is irrelevant to the calculation of the damages
needed to induce allocative efficiency." William Bishop & John Sutton, Efficiency and
Justice in Tort Damages: The Shortcomings of the Pecuniary Loss Rule, 15 J. Legal Stud.
347, 351 (1986).
40
Again, this presentation glosses over some of the complexity; see Goldberg, Merrill,
& Unumb, supra note 36, at 1106-20.
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of the bonus is zero. 41 This proposition is just a variation on the efficient
market hypothesis in its weakest form. The parties make an informed
guess about future market conditions when negotiating the rent. Sometimes they will be overly optimistic and sometimes overly pessimistic.
But, on average, they will get it about right.
Since the expected value of the leasehold interest is zero, the tenant
does not give up much by surrendering its claim to the landlord when
entering into the lease. But something important is gained-the costs,
legal and otherwise, of hassling over division of the award are avoided.
By agreeing, in effect, not to contest the landlord's claim to the entire
award, the tenant increases the size of the pot available to the two
parties. 42

B.

Charter Price versus Market Price

The first pass using the eminent domain analogy therefore suggests that
Holmes's decision was correct but that the net result was wrong. Flint
should end up without compensation, but the ship's owners should have
received a larger settlement-a matter about which the courts could do
nothing since the question of Robins's liability to the owners never
reached the courts. However, it is possible to rationalize an outcome in
which the owner receives the entire award and that award is based on
the contract price rather than the current market price. The costs of
deviating from the undivided fee rule are likely to be low, and it is at
least plausible that basing recovery on the charter price will economize
on measurement costs.
Recall that the virtue of assessing the wrongdoer the market value of
the damage is that this would induce the proper amount of care. In the tort
context, but not the eminent domain context, the contract price would do
just about as well. The reason for this is a variation on the efficient market
argument offered above. The tortfeasor does not usually know whether
property is under contract and, if it is, what the terms might be. 43 If it is
assessed the contract value of the damages, sometimes the assessed damages will be too high and other times too low; but if there are no system41

Id. at 1110.
Of course, even after they have entered into such an agreement, tenants will occasionally contest the award. Courts have used a number of doctrines (for example, the law abhors
a forfeiture) to abet tenants in avoiding the consequences of their condemnation clauses;
see id., at 1120-25.
43
In Robins, the dry dock was not a stranger, and information about the special terms
could have been conveyed to the dry dock. Generally, however, the wrongdoer would be
a stranger.
42
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atic biases, the expected value of the contract and market damages should
be about the same. In periods of rapidly rising prices (as in Robins), the
contract prices would on average be a bit too low, and when prices were
rapidly falling the contract prices would be too high. Thus, the tortfeasor's incentives to take care might be somewhat distorted in periods of
rapid, systematic price changes. Generally, though, the incentive effects
for the tortfeasor are basically unaffected by whether the damages are
reckoned by the contract value or the market value.
In the eminent domain context, the contract value versus market value
choice does matter. Typically, the tortfeasor did not know the contract
terms and therefore presumed that the expected value of damages it
caused would be the market value. A government exercising the power
of eminent domain would not operate behind this veil of ignorance. If
paying the contract price satisfied the constitutional obligation, governments would have an incentive to skew their takings, condemning property with a positive bonus value and eschewing parcels with a negative
bonus value. 44
Assuming that little is lost by reckoning the tortfeasor's liability by the
contract value, what, if anything, is to be gained by doing so? The answer
is that it saves the costs of measurement. To determine the damages
caused by Robins's negligence, we just look at the lease price and calculate the price for fourteen days. This is much easier and cheaper than
taking testimony on the market value of the ship. This point was nicely
underscored in the commissioner's damage measurement. Flint introduced evidence to indicate that the market price at the time of the accident was even higher than the rental specified in the subcharter with
Norton. The commissioner accepted the evidence but then chose to use
the subcharter price, presumably because he was more comfortable with
that number than with the opinion evidence offered by the ship broker
called by Flint. 45
C.

Temporary versus Permanent Harm

The measurement problem is resolved quite differently if the damage
is permanent. We have to some degree been comparing apples and or-

44
Of course, some torts are intentional and· some takings inadvertent (for example, flooding caused by a government project). Nonetheless, in most instances the characterization
in the text is correct.
45
At the hearing to estimate damage, Flint introduced testimony from a ship broker that
the market rate for a ship like the Bjornefjord in the first half of August 1917 was between
$87,000 and $93,000 per month (about 10 to 15 percent above the rate in the Norton sub-
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anges. For the permanent taking, the damages are measured by the market value, while for the temporary harm caused by the tortfeasor, the
damages are measured by the contract price. What then of the permanent
harm or temporary taking? If the tortfeasor caused permanent harm (for
example, the ship sinks), the charter would almost always be drafted so
that such an event would result in termination (just as the lease would
terminate when the parcel is condemned);46 consequently, the undivided
fee rule would apply, and the owner would receive the entire award,
measured by the ship's market value at the time it was destroyed. 47
Temporary takings are rare, but they do occur. 48 The default rule for
a temporary taking is that the tenant remains liable to the landlord for
the contract rent and the government compensates the tenant alone
for the fair market value of the leasehold. However, if the parties have
a standard space lease, the lease will usually include a condemnation
clause that terminates the lease; the landlord would then receive all the
compensation as measured by the current market value. 49
Thus, the added complications arising from comparing apples with
apples do not change the moral of Judge Goddard's analogy. The efficient
rule (if the tenant or charterer has not installed substantial improvements)50 is for the tenant/charterer to receive nothing and for the owner
to receive the market value except when measurement costs make it
charter). Cases and Points, supra note 9, at 29. It does not appear that Norton filed a suit
to recover the loss of its bonus value.
46 Both the charter and subcharter in Robins included a clause that made the charter
"null and void" if the underwriters condemned the steamer. Cases and Points, supra note
9, at 14, 32.
47
The general rule is that the wrongdoer is liable for the value of the ship at the time of
destruction; see Gilmore & Black, supra note 30, at§ 7-18; see also Asphalt International,
Inc. v. Enterprise Shipping Corporation, S.A., 667 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1981). Vinland, 1925
A.M.C. 1141, was a significant exception. There a commission hearing claims for American
interests in vessels sunk by the Germans in the First World War held that market value
determined the German liability but chose to ignore the termination clause and divided the
award as per the charter terms. Of course, for this class of cases it is almost certain that
the charter price was below the market price at the time of the sinking. Therefore, the
commission did not have to deal with negative bonus value charters. Vinland, which was
decided in the period between Goddard's and Holmes's decisions in Robins, drew upon
Goddard's decision to justify the outcome.
48
A number of cases arose during the Second World War when the government temporarily converted leased property to wartime uses; see, for example, United States v. General
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
49
Goldberg, Merrill, & Unumb, supra note 36, at 1118-20.
50 For time charters that proviso would almost always hold. For leases of real property,
tenant improvements will often be important and condemnation clauses become more complicated as the parties try to compensate the tenant for such improvements without encouraging excessive strategic behavior in a condemnation proceeding; see id. at 1112-16.
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practical to use the contract price. Robins, arguably, fits within that exception. 51
D.

Negative Leasehold

Giving Flint an action for market value would create another set of
complications. In the actual case, Flint had a large positive bonus, and
it is natural that he would try to get compensated through the courts. But
suppose that the market price of shipping had fallen after he had entered
into his lease. The tort would release him from an onerous obligation;
Flint would have the equivalent of a ''negative leasehold.'' Thus, if Flint
could sue when the bonus value was positive, but did not have to disgorge
when the bonus value was negative, we would have an asymmetric result. 52 The wrongdoer would be liable to the owner for the contract rent
regardless. If the market price had risen, the wrongdoer would also have
been liable for the bonus value. If the market value had fallen, however,
it would not have had its liability reduced. The wrongdoer would pay the
positive bonus value but not be credited for taking the negative bonus
value. Since the expected value of the bonus is zero, wrongdoers as a
class would pay too much. 53
The same sort of problem would arise if the owner had a choice of
suing for the contract rent when the bonus value was negative or the
market value when the bonus value was positive. The case in which
the owner sues as trustee for the charterer is a hybrid of these two. If
the wrongdoer cannot compel the parties to present their claims as a
package, then it is vulnerable to selective litigation. This problem is
avoided in the eminent domain context where the action is against the
land itself rather than the interests different parties have in that Iand. 54
The government's liability is fixed irrespective of the maneuvering of the
parties.
Tort defendants might attempt to protect themselves from a strategy
51 The charter rate establishes at least prima facie evidence of the magnitude of the loss.
See The Brand, 224 F. 391 (3d Cir. 1915). A court could determine in a Robins-type case
that the charter price so clearly departed from the market price that it would take other
evidence on the market price.
52
In the eminent domain context, "[n]o cases have been found, and it is unlikely that
any court will so decide at the present time, that the lessee contribute or pay the negative
value of his interest upon a complete taking.'' Alan N. Polasky, The Condemnation of
Leasehold Interests, 48 Va. L. Rev. 477, 492 (1962).
53 If this overpayment were anticipated, then it would be incorporated in the initial charter
price. The charterer would buy the use of the vessel for a fixed period plus a lottery ticket
that pays off if there is a tortiously caused delay and a positive bonus value.
54
See Goldberg, Merrill, & Unumb, supra note 36, at 1092.
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of selective participation by various procedural devices-for example,
compulsory joinder. I will not explore the efficacy of any such defensive
strategy. 55 It is sufficient to note that, if we assess the wrongdoer the
positive bonus value, then there should be some mechanism in place to
credit the wrongdoer for taking a negative bonus value lease. This follows
both on efficiency grounds-the asymmetric treatment of the bonus
would result in penalties that were, on average, too high-and, perhaps
surprisingly, on equity grounds as well.
Notice how this argument turns the equity argument on its head. I
suspect that most readers of Robins believe that Robins got away with
something and that the result was unfair to charterers. 56 That is why
Judges Goddard and Mack try so hard to avoid the consequences of the
economic loss doctrine. For Mack the ideal resolution of the case would
have had the owners recovering the bonus value as trustees for Flint.
But, if a wrongdoer would not get credit for destroying the negative
bonus value, Mack's rule would lead to overcompensation for the class of
charterers. A rule that appears fair in the context of a single, isolated
case becomes unfair in the broader context.
This line of argument suggests that either of two routes would be appropriate. Either there should be no recovery for the bonus value (the charter
price should be used to reckon damages), or the market price of the
"undivided fee" should be used (which would take into account both
positive and negative bonuses). In either case, the magnitude of the damages is a matter of tort law, and the division of damages is a matter of
contract.

E.

The Analogy Not Taken

Judge Goddard ignored a more obvious analogy. Instead of invoking a
governmental taking of leased property, he could have asked what happens when a third party's negligence results in an interference with the
use of leased property. The answer is a complicated amalgam of the
common law, statutes, and lease terms, with an overlay of insurance.
Consider the following hypothetical case which closely tracks the Robins facts. Smith has a five-year lease from Jones at $1,000 per month with
a current market value of $3,000 per month. Brown negligently causes a
fire that results in Smith's shop being closed for one month. The lease
55 In his dissent in Agwilines, Inc. v. Eagle Oil & Shipping Co., 153 F.2d 869, 873 (2d
Cir. 1946), Charles Clark, the father of the federal rules of civil procedure, discusses some
procedural devices that could be used to combine the claims of the owner and charterer.
56 See, for example, Bishop & Sutton, supra note 39, at 350-51.
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has a rent abatement clause that allows Smith to stop paying rent in the
event that the shop is closed because of fire damage. Is the wrongdoer
liable for $1,000 or $3,000? To whom is it liable? Robins would appear
to resolve this question by paying $1,000 to the owner and nothing to the
tenant. 57 Landlord/tenant law and modern leases would almost certainly
have Brown pay $1,000 to Jones (the landlord) and $2,000 to Smith (the
tenant).
If the wrongdoer's act deprived a tenant of the use of leased property,
the common-law rule was very simple. The tenant had a property right
in the leasehold and the landlord a right in the reversion. If, say, the
property was rendered worthless in perpetuity, the lessee was still liable
to the landlord for the contract rent. If a third party was responsible for
the damage, the tenant could sue for the damage to the leasehold interest
and the landlord for the reversion. 58 If the damage were temporary (so
that it ceased before the lease ended), then the landlord would have
suffered no harm (it would still be paid rent as per the lease). The tenant
would receive compensation for the market value of the leased property
for the period that it is out of use; that is, the tenant would receive, in
effect, the contract rent plus the bonus value. 59 This is essentially the
same as the eminent domain rule.
A rent abatement clause, the landlord/tenant analog to the cesser of
hire clause in Robins, is an adjustment between the landlord and tenant
which should leave unaffected the sum of the wrongdoer's liability to
the two. While courts need not take such a clause into account when
determining the respective awards of landlord and tenant, in practice,
they do. 60
In both the eminent domain and tort contexts, the formal rules of landlord/tenant law are not particularly helpful. In both contexts, the formal
law is usually undone by the lease terms. In the tort context, the leases
rarely deal specifically with the question of the liability of a third party
to the landlord and tenant, respectively. Friedman on Leases, the leading
treatise, has an extensive treatment of the problems arising from the
damage and destruction of leased premises, the landlord's and tenant's
liability to each other for their negligence, 61 and of the interrelation be-

57 There is some ambiguity since Robins only deals with the claim of the charterer.
Holmes did not explicitly deal with a suit by the owner for more than the contract price.
58 Chubb Group of Ins. v. C.F. Murphy & Assoc., 656 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. App. 1983).
59 See I Restatement (Second) of Property,§ 5.2 comment g, and§ 5.4 comment i (1977).
60 Lemon v. Fein, 467 So. 2d 548 (4th Cir. 1985).
61 Milton R. Friedman, I Friedman on Leases, §§ 9.1-9. IO (2d ed. 1983).
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tween the insurance obligations of landlord and tenant. 62 However, it is
silent on the rights of the parties against a third-party wrongdoer.
Modem leases generally override the common-law rule that would
compensate the tenant if the property had been destroyed. Usually parties allow the lease to terminate in this instance just as it would for a
permanent taking. Up to this point the analogy brings us to the same
conclusion as before. If there is complete destruction of the leased property, the wrongdoer would be liable only to the owner and the liability
would depend on the market value, not the contract price.
Beyond this, it gets tricky. The drafting problem is considerably more
difficult if the property is not totally destroyed. Often, one or both parties
is given the option of repairing the destroyed property or terminating the
lease if damages are severe enough. 63 (The determination of severity
could be left to a third party like the insurance underwriter.) Since the
landlord and tenant usually have insurance and since the proceeds of
insurance are generally set aside to finance the repair of the damaged
property, the division of the award between the two parties is often irrelevant. 64
Nonetheless, despite the fact that modem leases undo most of the
common law (and constitutional law) ofleaseholds, they continue to leave
largely intact the rule making third-party wrongdoers liable to the two
separate interests for a temporary disruption. If the disruption occurs
entirely within the term of the lease (that is, there is no interference with
the reversion), then the tenant has a claim against the wrongdoer based
on the market value of the property during the disruption. If there is a
rent abatement clause, the tenant would end up with the bonus value.
That is precisely the outcome that was rejected in Robins.
Why the difference? The different treatment between the eminent domain and tort claims of the tenant probably stems from the disparate
treatment of consequential damages. In a tort action, the tenant can recover for lost profits, including consequential damages, 65 but consequential damages are not recoverable for a taking. 66 For vessels under charter,
courts will not usually recognize consequential damages. Damages are
lost profits, and "the best measure of loss of earnings is the amount of
62

Id. at vol. 3, § 38.1.
Id. at vol. I, §§ 9.2-9.9.
64
The insurer would be subrogated against the tortfeasor.
65
See Lemon, supra note 60; Chubb Group Ins., supra note 58; and Berlin Development
Corporation v. Vermont Structural Steel, 250 A 2d 189 (Vt. 1968).
66
See 4A Julius L. Sackman & Patrick J. Rohan, Nichols on Eminent Domain (3d ed.
rev. 1990), § 14.01.
63
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profits which the owner would have realized had the vessel been able to
perform under the charter. " 67 In the lease context, since the tenant could
recover anticipated profits, it would make no sense to adjust this amount
by breaking out the bonus value separately. Its expected value is again
zero, and treating it as part of the anticipated profits means that there is
one less magnitude to measure. It is cheaper to award anticipated profits
that implicitly include the bonus value than it would be to explicitly adjust
the profits to exclude the bonus value.
IV.

A

BRIEF DIGRESSION: SIMPSON V. THOMSON

A narrow interpretation of Robins is that it only concerns a question
of standing. The charterer has suffered no direct economic loss and cannot sue. However, the charterer might have been able to recover its
losses indirectly if the owner had sued. The charter could have obligated
the owner to sue third parties and could have specified a rule for dividing
the award. Thus, it might not matter much if the court got it wrong. The
next generation of charters (contracts) would be revised to yield the correct outcome. Doctrine could evolve along its own path while the law
created by the parties evolved in a different direction.
That outcome would not necessarily be bad. It is, after all, roughly
what happened in landlord/tenant law. It does create some difficulties,
however. Contracting around the inappropriate rule might be expensive. 68
Also, the application of inapt doctrine to new fact situations might generate considerable transitional costs.
Regardless of whether it is good or bad, the separate evolution of doctrine and practice can muddy the debate. A good example of this is provided by Simpson v. Thomson, 69 a case discussed at great length in Robins's brief 70 and modern economic loss cases (especially in the
Commonwealth). 71 The basic facts are simple. Two ships (A and B) col67
Sabine Transportation Company, Inc. v. Steamship Esso Utica, 1955 A.M.C 2102,
2106. This case involved a negative bonus. The charterer was a subsidiary of the owner,
and while the damaged vessel was being repaired the owner hired another vessel at a price
below the charter price. The commissioner held that the owner could recover for the full
charter value.
68 If parties are uncertain that the courts will enforce their variations on the default rule,
that adds to the expense.
69
3 App Cas 279 (1877).
7 Cases and Points, supra note 9, Brief for Petitioner, at 13-15. The case was cited in
passing by Mack but not cited at all by Holmes or Goddard.
71
See, for example, Weller v. Foot & Mouth Disease Research Institute, (1965) [1966] 1
Q.B. 569; 3 All E. R. 560; Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd. v. Martin & Co., [1973] I Q.B. 27;
SCM (United Kingdom) Ltd. v. W.J. Whittal & Sons Ltd. Court of Appeal, Civil Division,
1970 [1971] I Q.B. 337.
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lided; A was at fault, and B suffered a total loss. Ship B recovered from
its underwriters who then sued A. 72 Normally, the underwriters would
be subrogated to B and the recovery would be routine. The twist was
that A and B were owned by the same person. Since the owner could
not sue himself, the underwriters could not be subrogated. The underwriters tried to sue on their own account, but the court would have none of
it. The underwriters suffered only an economic loss and could not be
compensated for their loss.
The leading British treatise on marine insurance contains a lengthy
discussion of Simpson v. Thomson 73 that is entirely in terms of doctrinal
questions; it is silent on whether the rule survives in practice. The silence
is not based on ignorance of practice but rather on the notion that the
actual practice of the parties is irrelevant. In fact, the practice is to undo
the decision by including in the insurance contract a "sister ship clause"
that, in effect, allows the vessel to sue another vessel owned by the
same owner. The clause is described in the same treatise without even a
cross-reference to the discussion of Simpson v. Thomson. 74
Thus, the outcome in Simpson was clearly wrong. Had they thought
of it, the parties would have wanted to give the insurer the same right of
subrogation for sister ships that it would have in collisions with strangers.
That does not, however, mean that the decision was necessarily wrong.
One could plausibly argue that there are benefits to defining a small class
of people who could directly sue the wrongdoer and forcing others to
channel their claims through that group. 75 For my purposes, it is unnecessary to decide whether the decision could be justified on that ground. All
I want to do here is underscore the point that, in Robins, Holmes might
have been quite indifferent to the merits of the outcome. His concern
72
There is an added complication. A's liability was limited by statute so the underwriter's
recovery would come out of a fixed pot to be shared with the cargo owners, master, and
crew.
73
British Shipping Laws IO, The Law of Marine Insurance and Average II, at ,i,i 1216-19
(Arnould's 15th ed. 1961).
74
"[S]hould the vessel hereby insured come into collision with or receive salvage services
from another vessel belonging wholly or in part to the same owners, or under the same
management, the assured shall have the same rights under this policy as they would have
were the other vessel entirely the property of owners not interested in the vessel hereby
insured." Id. at 11 782.
75 Mario Rizzo has suggested that the bar on recovery for pure economic loss can be
understood as a rule for channeling claims through the parties that suffer physical injury.
See Mario J. Rizzo, A Theory of Economic Loss in the Law of Torts, 11 J. Legal Stud.
281 (1982). While Rizzo has been criticized for overstating the importance of the channeling
explanation (see Robert L. Rabin, Tort Recovery for Negligently Inflicted Economic Loss:
A Reassessment, 37 Stan. L. Rev. 1513, 1535 n.72 (1985)), his view contains a substantial
element of truth.

268

THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES

might have been one of form, not substance. Robins might only establish
a standing rule (the charterer acting on its own does not have standing)
and a default rule for sharing the recovery between two contractually
linked parties (absent language to the contrary, only the owner recovers).
V.

BEYOND THE BONUS VALUE

Even with that narrow reading, Robins presents some ambiguities. It
has confused subsequent courts in cases that were very similar except
that something other than the bonus value was at stake. In this section,
I want to consider two such problems. In the first, the only difference
from Robins is that the charter did not include a cesser of hire clause.
In the second, the detained ship had contracted with fishermen whose
compensation from the boat owner was based on a share of the catch.

A.

Hire Continues

Suppose that there had been no cesser-of-hire (or rent abatement)
clause. In that event, the owner would have suffered no financial harmit would have continued to receive payment. Should the wrongdoer be
absolved? Should the owner recover the rent for the two weeks from
both the charterer as per contract and the wrongdoer under tort law? Or
should Robins's check ultimately wind up in Flint's pocket because it is
either directly liable or under some trustee type argument? The reasoning
of both Mack and Goddard would lead to the third outcome. Holmes's
resolution is unclear.
The issues arose in Agwilines, Inc. v. Eagle Oil & Shipping Co. 76 During the Second World War, the U.S. government, as a charterer, requisitioned vessels for the war effort. The standard charter agreement required
that the government pay half hire while the ship was undergoing repair.
A ship was damaged and put out of service for nine days, and the owner
sued for the loss of hire for that period. The commissioner and the district
court held that the owner's recovery would be diminished by the amount
that it received from the charterer while the ship was being repaired. In
a divided opinion, Judge Learned Hand affirmed. 77
Hand, it should be recalled, had joined Mack in his opinion in Robins
76

Note 55 supra.
A similar case arose in the English courts in the aftermath of the First World War. A
ship under requisition-time charter to the French government was damaged; the government
had to continue paying hire while the ship was under repairs. The court held that neither
the owner nor the charterer could recover; Chargeurs Reunis v. English & Am. Shipping
Co., 9 LI.LL.Rep. 464 (1921).
77
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two decades earlier. He appeared to be still smarting from having been
overturned in the earlier case.
When the case was before us, we held that, although the charterer had no proprietary interest in the ship and no contract with the drydocker, the drydocker could
not protect himself by the ordinary doctrine that a tortfeasor is not liable for
remote damages, because the whole loss from detention of the ship was to be
apprehended from his lack of care, whether the owner bore it all, or shared it
with a charterer, and that, the whole loss being therefore a direct consequence
of his negligence, he should not be allowed to cut down his liability .... To all
of this the Supreme Court said "no." ... Perhaps it was not necessary ... to
consider our argument that the owner might be treated as suing on behalf of the
charterer; but the court did so and definitely repudiated it. ... In the face of this
decision we cannot see how we can do otherwise than affirm the decree at bar;
if any change is to be made the Supreme Court must make it. 78

In his dissent, Judge Charles Clark distinguished Robins, asserting that
it only precluded a suit by the charterer. It did not prevent the owner
from suing for damages. In answer to the claim that the owner had already
been compensated for its losses by the continued payment of the charter
hire, Clark argued that ''payments or reparations of whatever nature
which the injured party receives from a collateral source are, in the words
of the courts, res inter alios acta, of no concern to the wrongdoer. " 79
This formulation leaves open the question of who ends up with the wrongdoer's damage payment-the vessel owner (collateral source rule) or the
charterer.
Three decades later, the Fourth Circuit faced essentially the same case,
except that the suit was brought by the charterer. 80 Judge Haynsworth
noted that, following Agwilines, the owner could not recover because it
had received full charter hire while the vessel was being repaired. The
charterer could recover, however, under his reading of Robins. Since
Flint had not paid charter hire during the delay, its claim was "for loss
of anticipated profits. " 81 The charter could recover for loss of use (the
charter hire) but not the lost profits (the bonus value). That the charterer
did not have a property interest in the vessel was merely a technicality.
As the dissent noted, with this reading, Robins turns on the measure of
damages rather than on the notion that the charterer had no standing. 82
78
79

80
81
82

Agwilines, supra note 55, at 871-72.
Id. at 873.
Venore Transportation Company v. M/V Struma, 583 F.2d 708 (4th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 710.
Id. at 711.
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There is a significant distinction between Robins and the case in which
the charterer continues to pay hire. In Robins the expected value of the
bonus value at the time of entering into the charter was zero. The wrongdoer is liable to the owner for the charter price, and the charterer receives
nothing. Sometimes this results in a windfall for the wrongdoer and sometimes a loss. But, on balance, the wrongdoers bear the costs of their
actions, and the charterers are adequately compensated. If, however, the
charterer must continue to pay hire, a rule that compensates the owner
for its actual losses (that is, does not compensate for lost hire) and denies
the charterer standing yields an unhappy outcome. The wrongdoers systematically are underassessed, and the charterers undercompensated. Either Clark's or Haynsworth's approach would avoid this outcome.
The response to Agwilines dramatically illustrates the error of the outcome. The charter form was subsequently revised in such a way as to
make the wrongdoer liable to the charterer. The revised charter term was
approved in M. & J. Tracy, Inc. v. Tug Rowen Card, Card Towing Line. 83
The commissioner noted that the government ''frankly concedes that
Clause 4 is a revised form which was prompted by the Agwilines decision
in the Court of Appeals. " 84 Notwithstanding the improbability of this
chronology, 85 it is clear that the Agwilines litigation triggered a search for
a mechanism that would assess the wrongdoer the damages arising from
the detention.
U oder the amended clause the obligation to pay hire would cease if a
third party was liable. 86 The charterer would indemnify the owner and
continue to make payments. The charterer would then be subrogated to
83

1953 A.M.C. 1700.

84

Id. at 1704.
85
The Tracy collision took place on February 21, 1945; the amended time charter was
dated June 5, 1944. The Agwilines detention occurred in June, 1943. Liability was deter-

mined in the district court on August 18, 1944, and a commissioner was appointed at that
date to assess damages; the commissioner's decision was handed down on February 20,
1945. The decisions of the district court and appeals court were on March 29, 1945, and
January 10, 1946, respectively. Obviously, the charter term was amended long before the
appeals court acted.
86 The amended Clause 4 read as follows: "In the event that the Vessel is detained ...
for which detention such third parties are or may be liable ... then for such period of
detention the Charterer's obligation to the Owner for hire and for other sums otherwise
accruing hereunder shall cease: Provided, however, that the Charterer shall indemnify and
save the Owner harmless from any loss whatsoever by reason of the cessation of such
obligations, and notwithstanding said cessation shall pay to the Owner a sum not less than
the amount which would otherwise be payable to the Owner for such obligations in the same
manner and to the same extent as if such cessation had not occurred, but on performance of
this indemnity the Charterer shall immediately become subrogated, to the extent of such
indemnity, to all rights whatsoever of the Owner to recover for such detention from or
against such vessel, person, corporation, or others, and the Charterer shall be entitled to
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the owner. Moreover, the charterer could bring a suit in its own name or
in the name of the owner. The owner agreed that it would assert and
prosecute claims on behalf of the charterer with the charterer paying legal
fees. The net result of all of this is that the charterer could sue the wrongdoer for the loss of hire.
The process of contracting around a rule that would yield an incorrect
outcome illustrates a number of points. First, the parties can respond
quickly when the rule seems clearly wrong. Second, it will often not be
obvious what will work; the clause seems to give the charterer three bites
at the apple-subrogation, suit in its own name, and the owner's promise
to sue on the charterer's behalf. The redundancy probably reflected
doubts about the efficacy of each. Third, the wrong outcome in Agwilines
carried over to all other government requisition-time charters prior to
June 1944. 87 Moreover, the uncertainty about whether the new Band-Aid
solved their problem was not resolved until 1953, eight years after the
war ended. Fourth, a minor variant on this clause could have been appended to all time charters, including those with cesser of hire clauses.
That is, a clause like this could have been used to contract around the
Robins decision. The fact that it was not done, even after this innovative
clause was approved by the courts, provides further evidence that the
Robins outcome was correct.
Thus, there were three routes to the correct result: the owner recovers
directly as a matter of law (Clark), the charterer recovers directly as
a matter of law (Haynsworth), or the charterer recovers if the charter
agreement were drafted cleverly so as to avoid the natural legal result.
Clark's route strikes me as the cleanest route to the proper result. It
is consistent with the precedent (Haynsworth required an extraordinary
stretch), and it sets out the legal problem in simple terms. First, assess
damages; second, divide the award.
B.

Sharing

Suppose that the vessel damaged by Robins had been a fishing vessel
that was then put out of service for two weeks. The vessel owner had
bring and maintain suit or suits thereon in its own name or in the name of the Owner as
the Charterer may see fit: Provided, however, That on the written request of the Charterer,
the Owner shall in each instance, assert and prosecute such claims in the name of the
Owner, but for and on behalf of the Charterer and at the Charterer's expense, such claims
to be in a sum not less than the amount of the indemnity paid by the Charterer" (id. at
1703).
87 This problem could have been even worse if the government did not have the power
to amend all the charters at once. Otherwise, the rule could have applied to all charters
entered into before June 1944 and not amended.
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agreed to compensate the fishermen with a percentage of the proceeds of
the sale of the fish caught after an allowance for certain expenses. 88 How
should the courts respond to a claim by the fishermen that they should
be compensated for the payments they would have received had the vessel not been idled? The Ninth Circuit held in 1951 that this case was
governed by Robins and denied recovery. 89 Two years later, however,
the court reversed itself in Carbone v. Ursich. 90
Carbone cited a number of earlier opinions, including some that predate Robins, allowing the fishermen to recover from the tortfeasor either
directly or by the owner of the vessel suing in trust for the fishermen.
The court argued that the existence of the pre-Robins decisions suggested
that Holmes meant for these decisions to remain unaffected by Robins:
"As we now view the matter, it must be assumed that Mr. Justice
Holmes, who wrote the opinion in the Robins Dry Dock case, was familiar with such cases as The Columbia, The Mary Steele, and Taber v.
Jenny .... It is noteworthy that the Robins Dry Dock case contains no
internal evidence of an intention to reverse a course of prior decisions
relating to the liability of persons in the position of the respondent for
losses sustained by fishermen such as these appellants. " 91 Perhaps
Holmes was aware of these earlier cases. However, none of these cases
was mentioned in any of the Robins briefs, and I find it a bit of a stretch
to read Holmes's silence as implicit acquiescence. 92 Nonetheless, Carbone can be distinguished from Robins.
Analytically, there are two separate routes toward rationalizing compensation for the fishermen. These depend on the extent to which the
fishermen's share is viewed as payment for services already rendered or
as payment for future effort. Carbone had elements of both the past
and future compensation. The tortfeasor damaged the net, causing the
fishermen to lose the fish that they had already captured; in addition,
they were unable to fish for three days and sued to recover their projected
88 This is a common way of compensating fishermen, sometimes called a "lay" plan. See
Carbone v. Ursich, The Del Rio, 209 F.2d 178 (9th Cir. 1953) and some of the cases cited
therein.
89
Borcich v. Ancich, 191 F.2d 392 (9th Cir. 1951).
90 Carbone, supra note 88.
91
Id. at 181. The cases cited are The Columbia, D.C.N.Y.1877, 6 Fed.Cas. No. 3,035,
at 173; The Mary Steele, D.C.Mass. 1874, 16 Fed.Cas. No. 9, 226. at 1003; and Taber v.
Jenny, D.C.D.Mass. 1856, 23 Fed.Cas. No. 13,720, at 605.
92
Carbone has been followed in a number of jurisdictions; see, for example, Miller
Industries v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813 (I Ith Cir. 1984). For criticism of Carbone, see Henderson v. Arundel Corporation, 262 F. Supp. 152, 159-60 (D. Md. 1966); and
Casado v. Schooner Pilgrim, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 78 (D. Mass. 1959). The former questions
Carbone's characterization of the pre-Robins case law.
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share for those three days. The argument for compensating the fishermen's past losses is clear-the case is essentially the same as Agwilines. The case for compensating the future losses is much weaker.
The easiest case is one in which the wrongdoer had caused the fishing
vessel to lose some fish that had already been captured. 93 If the wrongdoer only has to compensate the owner for the loss of its share, then it
is systematically undercharged for the damage it causes. It differs from
the Robins-type case in which the expected value of the bonus value
is zero so that there is not a systematic undercharge. Moreover, the
agreement between the owner and the fishermen does not provide an
immediate measure of the value of the ship, as it did in Robins. In Robins,
compensating the owner for the lost rental and not compensating the
charterer had two virtues: the level of compensation was correct on average, and the contract rent provided a cheap measure of the expected
damages. If the contract rent is in the form of a sharing formula, however,
neither of these virtues remain.
Like Agwilines, the case presents two separate issues: the magnitude
of the damages assessed against the tortfeasor and the division of those
damages between the owner and the fishermen. The former is a matter
of tort; the latter is (or ought to be) a matter of contract. There is no
reason in principle that the contract between the fishermen and the owner
could not allocate the entire award to one or the other. However, there
is good reason to believe that they would not choose to do so. The sensible default rule would be to share the award according to the sharing
formula specified in the contract between the owner and the fishermen.
An intermediate case presents a somewhat more difficult problem. Suppose that employees engage in prevoyage activities that were to have
been compensated out of the receipts from the voyage or season. 94 Their
claim is, at base, a claim in contract against the owner. The employees
provided effort that enhanced the value of the owner's vessel; the tortfeasor's act then reduced the value of the vessel. Again, the vessel owner
93
In Taber v. Jenny, supra note 91, one vessel had captured a whale, which was stolen
by a second vessel. The owner of the first vessel and the fishermen each sued to recover
their respective shares. The owner recovered and the remaining issue was whether the
fishermen were entitled to recover their "lay" or "share.'"
94
Miller Industries involved a substantial backward looking component: "The court ...
awarded damages to ... a crew member ... and to the shipowners as trustee for the other
crew members' share of the lost catch. His award was based on a finding that the crew
members' sole compensation for their work, including preparatory work during the summer
and early fall and the sailing of the vessel from Mobile to Seattle, was based on a percentage
of the gross catch (eight percent for each of the four crew members and seventeen percent
for the Captain)" (Miller Industries, et al. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 733 F.2d 813, 816

(1984)).
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should have an action against the wrongdoer for the reduced value of the
vessel. The sharing rule is not relevant for determining the liability. It
would only come into play in dividing the award. What makes this case
more difficult is that the fishermen's claim is no longer unambiguously
backward looking. If the resolution of the claim is different for forwardand backward-looking claims, then there is less reason to believe that a
simple default rule-give the fishermen their share of the award-would
serve well for the mixed case.
Let us, therefore, turn to the harder case in which the fishermen's
share is primarily compensation for labor not yet performed-that is, it
is a substitute for future wages. Suppose, to take the extreme case, that
the owner of a damaged vessel had not yet entered into a contract with
any fishermen. The simple measure of the owner's damages would be the
expected market value of the fish that would have been caught less the
costs to be incurred in capturing them, which would include the costs
of the fishermen's time and effort. 95 Any compensation received by the
fishermen would not be a matter of dividing a tortfeasor's fixed liability
between the fishermen and the owner. The fishermen's compensation, if
any, would be in addition to the owner's. This is obvious if the owner
had hired no fishermen at the time of the accident, as in the hypothetical
example. It is equally true if the fishermen had already been hired at a
fixed fee, a fixed wage, or with a sharing contract. Their claim would be
for earnings forgone. The fishermen are in the same position as employees
who are temporarily laid off because a tortfeasor damaged their factory. 96
The form of their compenseation has nothing to do with the merits of
their claim.
The backward-looking case, like Robins and Agwilines, essentially involved measurement of a fixed loss and the division of that loss between
two (or more) claimants. How would rational parties choose to divide a
potential claim of fixed, but unknown size, when they enter into a contract? And how could they assure that their contractual relationship did
not result in a systematic reduction in the magnitude of their joint claim?
95 Note that this does not imply that the vessel owner has a property right in the as-yetuncaptured fish. This is just a way to estimate the highest and best use of a physical asset
that is not easily priced (the fishing vessel) during the period that it is out of service. It is
analogous to valuing a damaged hotel by the expected net revenues, even though the hotel
does not own its customers.
96
"[S)uppose a fishing vessel were sunk outright. Would all members of the crew be
entitled to compensation until they obtained new employment, or if that employment were
on a less profitable ship, for the difference? I believe the fundamental principles of liability
should be the same, whether employees are fishermen, or factory men" (Casado v. Schooner
Pilgrim, Inc., supra note 92).
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The forward-looking case raises a completely different set of issues.
What, for example, is the basis for their claim: fairness? good faith reliance? Further, should the employees be required to mitigate their damages by taking other employment? They could not mitigate in the
backward-looking case since their loss would be independent of their
future behavior. But mitigation is clearly a possibility in a forwardlooking case. Indeed, if the employees have no specific human capital,
their only losses would be transitional costs-their downtime while moving from the injured employer to another.
Should employees be compensated for their future wages if a vessel
were destroyed? Should it matter if they had skills that were uniquely
related to that particular vessel or if their skills were easily transferred
to alternative employment. Should their compensation depend on their
efforts to mitigate damages? These are hard questions, and I do not intend
to resolve them here. For my purposes, it is sufficient to note that resolving them requires an entirely different intellectual apparatus than the one
employed in this article.
VI.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Tort law is under constant pressure to extend the boundaries of what
constitutes a compensable injury. The economic loss doctrine has been
a significant factor in delimiting the boundaries, and the Robins decision
has been a key element of the doctrine. My analysis of Robins suggests
that, analytically, it differs fundamentally from the bulk of the cases that
raise the economic loss question. To decide that, say, Exxon should not
have to compensate Alaskan innkeepers because Robins did not have to
compensate Flint is a non sequitur. Since courts are at least somewhat
reluctant to being bound by ill-fitting precedent, the analysis might be
taken as an invitation for the assault on yet another citadel against the
expansion of tort liability.
However, the moral of this story is not that the Robins rule results in
bad decisions. Indeed, I suspect that the rule's denial of recovery is often
correct, despite the fact that the Robins analysis would be irrelevant in
the particular context. My point is that the rule has to be rethought. We
require some intellectual apparatus for evaluating the myriad of claims
for recovery of mere economic loss. The analysis of Robins illuminates
one small corner of the problem. By breaking the problem down into a
series of such manageable problems, I hope to provide the building blocks
for a more satisfactory disposition of claims for economic losses.

